Turner's Time Management

Both the Sports Guy and TMQ are taking Norv Turner to task for his decision to try an onside kick with 2:12 left in last week's game and down 3 points.

TMQ's argument is:

With 4:42 left in the fourth quarter, and San Diego trailing 17-7, he ordered a field goal attempt on fourth-and-2 from the Jets' 22-yard line. Nate Kaeding is a good kicker -- it was a surprise when his attempt sailed wide. But you have one of the league's top offenses and you only need 2 yards. Don't play for 10 points to force overtime (which Turner was doing) -- play to win! That's what Ryan was doing.

Turner's onside kick decision at the end was puzzling as well. Pulling within 17-14 with 2:14 remaining, San Diego had one timeout left. Unexpected onside kicks are 60 percent successful, expected onside kicks are 10 percent successful. Had the Bolts kicked deep and then held the Jets, considering the clock stops at the two-minute warning, San Diego would have gotten the ball back with about a minute to play, trailing by three. You've got a better chance of getting into field goal range with one minute on the clock than of recovering an expected onside kick. True, if you recover the onside kick, you are in a position to win the game. But it's very unlikely you will recover an onside kick under these circumstances.

A couple of thoughts. First, it's important to note that had Kaeding made the FG with 4:42 left, Turner's decision to kick would have been correct. The Chargers did wind up scoring a TD and the missed 3 would have been the points to have tied the game. So you can't fault him for kicking from the Jets 22, especially since Kaeding is such a reliable kicker (though not in that game and not in the playoffs generally).

Second, my brother and I discussed this at length when it happened, and we  both agreed the onside kick was the right call. You're down three and you need the ball back. Why not call the play that gives you the greatest (only?) chance of retaining possession? If the Chargers kick deep, figure the Jets will start around the 25 yard line. Assuming they pick up the same 8-9 yards that they did on the last possession, they'll be punting from the 33/34 yard line. A 40 yard net punt gives the Chargers the ball at their own 25 with less than a minute to play.

An onside kick if successful, obviously gives you the ball at your own 40. If it isn't, the Jets have the ball at the Chargers forty. Figure they won't risk a FG at that stage of the game in case it's missed and the Chargers get the ball at the spot of the kick. So they punt. If it's a good punt, the Jets might down it at the 10. If it's a bad punt it goes into the endzone and is a touchback. At worst, the Chargers only lose a net of 15 yards for trying the onside kick. Clearly the reward of getting the ball back outweighs the field position risk.

The one wrinkle in all of this was that the Chargers gave up too much yardage on the first three plays of the Jets' final drive and made going for it on 4th and 2 too enticing. A first down wins the game, which it did.

Had the Chargers kicked away and left the Jets facing the same 4th down situation from their own 33, rather than the Chargers' 29, the Jets likely don't pull a Belicheat and go for it on fourth down lest they leave the Chargers in immediate FG range if they don't convert.

In any case, it is hard to fault Turner for the decision he made even in retrospect. And the "controversy," such as it is shouldn't overshadow what was very astute time management on his team's part during the last 4 minutes of that game.